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Abstract: 
Does academic engagement accelerate or crowd out the 
commercialization of university knowledge? Research on this 
topic seldom considers the impact of the institutional 
environment, especially when a formal institution for 
encouraging the commercial activities of scholars has not yet 
been established. This study investigates this question in the 
context of China, which is in the institutional transition stage. 
Based on a survey of scholars from Shanghai Maritime 
University, we demonstrate that academic engagement has a 
positive impact on commercialization and that this impact is 
greater for risk-averse scholars than for other risk-seeking 
scholars. Our results suggest that in an institutional transition 
environment, the government should consider encouraging 
academic engagement to stimulate the commercialization 
activities of conservative scholars. 
Keywords: academic engagement, commercialization, risk 
preference 
1. Introduction 
Universities are central to the public research system, and the 
commercial exploitation of knowledge created in the university 
has become increasingly vital in the world, particularly for its 
role in stimulating economic growth. The commercialization of 
academic knowledge includes activities such as disclosure, 
patenting, licensing, and the transfer of patents and academic 
entrepreneurship activities. Indeed, commercialization 
essentially represents the “third mission” of universities and is 
encouraged in many countries (Foray & Lissoni, 2010).
However, commercialization was not always as legitimate as 
it currently appears. The commercialization activities were 
initially risky and constrained by the institutional environment. 
In the 1960s, the attitudes of US scientists toward 
commercialization were ambiguous because of the trade-off 
between the profits of commercialization activities and the risks 
of political embarrassment. Most scholars had not engaged in 
academic commercialization until the Bayh–Dole Act was 
enacted in 1980 (Hausman, 2018).The Act shifted the attitudes 
of US institutions toward encouraging commercialization, and 
today, commercialization is regarded as one of the missions of 
US universities. Universities such as Stanford and the MIT are 
famous for their commercialization outcomes, and many 
universities have established technology transfer offices (TTOs) 
to provide services for their professors (Siegel, Waldman, 
Atwater, & Link, 2004). 
Recent studies have highlighted the importance of academic 
engagement, a “knowledge-related collaboration between 
academic researchers with non-academic organizations” 
(Perkmann et al., 2013) with the aim of transferring scientific 
knowledge from universities to industries. Academic 
engagement refers to activities such as collaborative research, 
contract research, consulting, providing ad hoc advice and 
networking with practitioners. Compared to academic 
commercialization, academic engagement is more common and 
acceptable among scientists, as scholars have no need to be 
concerned about the legitimacy and uncertain impact of 
academic engagement on their scientific careers. However, the 
relationship between academic engagement and 
commercialization remains open for investigation (Perkmann et 
al., 2013). On the one hand, academic engagement may stimulate 
commercialization, because collaborating with industry can 
enlighten researchers about which scientific findings have more 
potential for commercialization, enabling them to invest more 
effort into patenting those findings for further licensing or spin-
offs (Shane, 2001). On the other hand, academic engagement 
may crowd out commercialization efforts. Through academic 
engagement, companies absorb enough academic knowledge for 
their business, and researchers and universities gain considerable 
payback (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2002).  
This study is set in the context of China, where a formal 
institution for the transfer of academic knowledge is far from 
established. Although Chinese government encourages 
universities to take part in commercialization activities and 
launched several relevant policies in 1996, 2002 and 2015, in 
practice, little scientific knowledge has been commercialized. 
Chinese scholars still fear the risks and uncertainty involved in 
the progress of commercialization, which range from peer 
pressure to gossip and even corruption-related dangers 
concealed within an inchoate institutional transaction process. 
One notable example is the case of Fu Lin12.  
 
1http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1001620/tsinghua-renews-contract-of-academic-
charged-with-corruption 
 
 Fu Lin a talent scientist at Tsinghua University who participates in academic 
entrepreneurship.In 2016, Fu was accused of academic corruption and arrested due 
Our study finds that academic engagement has a positive 
impact on commercialization and this impact is larger among 
risk-averse scholars. Additionally, organizational support 
improves commercial activities. This study contributes to the 
existing literatures through at least two aspects. First, the 
relationship between academic engagement and 
commercialization is deeply considered in our research. Second, 
individual risk preference is added to our model because risk 
preference has a moderating effect on the relationship between 
academic engagement and commercialization.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
theoretical framework and outlines the hypotheses. Section 3 
explains the methodological strategy. The main results of the 
empirical analysis are shown in Section 4. Finally, the 
conclusions are presented and discussed in Section 5. 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1 Commercialization in China 
Commercialization is the process of transferring academic 
knowledge to commercial use through discourse, patenting, and 
licensing (Thursby & Thursby, 2002, 2004) or by starting a for-
profit company (Ding & Choi, 2011; Etzkowitz, 1983; Shane & 
 
to the unintentional misuse of scientific funding from his university during the 
commercialization process.
Khurana, 2003; Stuart & Ding, 2006). Commercialization can 
make the best use of academic knowledge and stimulate the 
development of the economy and society, so many researchers 
have paid attention to the factors that affect commercialization. 
Studies have also found that institutional and organizational 
factors have an impact on commercialization (Heinecke, 2018). 
“Bringing institutions into evolutionary growth theory” (Nelson, 
2002) and commercialization in the institutional transition stage 
are therefore worth of the attention of scholars. 
In China, a formal institution that encourages scholar 
privilege has not yet been built. Several policies and legal 
reforms have been launched by the central government, and an 
informal exploration of commercialization by universities and 
scholars has already begun. The most three important policies 
were launched in 1996, 2002 and 2015. In 1996, the 
“Technology Transfer Law” was enacted by the National 
People’s Congress to encourage technology transfer, and it 
offered details regarding technological transfer. The reward 
share allocated to the inventor must be no less than 20 percent of 
the transfer returns. This law represents the first time that 
researchers’ privilege was officially acknowledged, but without 
further information regarding how to realize this privilege. In 
2002, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry 
of Finance published “Several Provisions on Intellectual 
Property Management of Research Achievements of National 
Research Projects”, which clarified that the property rights from 
public funded scientific programs are belong to the universities 
rather than the government. In 2015, a revision to the 
Technology Transfer Law was published, and it required 
academic scholars take at least half of profits to improve their’ 
incentives to transfer knowledge. 
2.2 Academic engagement and commercialization 
Academic engagement is defined as “a knowledge-related 
collaboration by academic researchers with non-academic 
organizations” (Perkmann et al., 2013, Mowery et al.,2015), 
Academic engagement includes activities such as collaborative 
research and contract research as well as consulting, providing 
ad hoc advice and networking with practitioners (Perkmann et 
al., 2013).  
   The relationship between academic engagement and 
commercialization attracts considerable interest. Academic 
engagement that provides scholars with opportunities to 
establish contact with industry will stimulate commercialization 
(Powell & Colyvas, 2007). Academic engagement offers 
scholars more industry experience, social capital and social 
networks, which are key elements in commercialization(Stuart 
& Ding, 2006). Based on data from the Natural Sciences and 
Engineering Research Council of Canada, Landry et al. found 
that when a researcher has consulting experience, the likelihood 
of launching a spinoff increases (Landry, Amara, & Rherrad, 
2006).  
On the other hand, academic engagement may crowd out 
commercialization. Cohen (2002) stated that consulting is more 
vital in transferring public research to industry than patents or 
licenses in most industries and that the return from academic 
engagement is much higher than that from commercialization 
(Perkmann et al., 2011). Focusing on academic engagement also 
limits the time available for commercialization. Ding and Choi 
(2011) found that a company’s scientific advisor is less likely to 
become an academic founder.  
In sum, direct commercialization is not a universal way to 
transfer knowledge when the formal system is not established. 
The relationship between academic engagement and 
commercialization is ambiguous and the empirical results might 
be a net effect. However, there have been few empirical 
investigations into this relationship. Hence, our first step is to 
test the following hypotheses: 
H1a/H1b: Academic engagement has a positive/negative 
impact on commercialization. 
2.3 Risk preference and commercialization 
Risk preference is one of the factors of commercialization 
and it moderates the relationship between academic engagement 
and commercialization. 
The risks involved in commercialization are caused by 
unclear institutions, as commercialization needs time to build a 
sufficient history. During the early stage of institutional 
transition, commercialization is not widely accepted, as in the 
USA in the 1960s and in China currently. Scholars may 
encounter risks due to gossip; some people believe that scholars 
who spend more time on scientific research have less time to take 
part in commercialization. Research has shown a negative 
correlation between scientific productivity and technological 
transfer performance (Barletta, Yoguel, Pereira, & Rodriguez, 
2017). Hence, scientists are afraid of being regarded as failures 
in terms of their scientific research. Moreover, scientists who 
participate in commercialization risk losing their academic 
freedom. Since the different goals of researchers and industry 
leading scholars can influence their research paths, companies 
may restrict their publications of outcomes for the sake of 
secrecy (Derrick, 2015). Commercialization is risky when 
scholars misunderstand ambiguous policies. An unintentional 
misuse of scientific funding can be easily linked to corruption, 
which can destroy the reputation and career development of a 
scientist. Hence, without sufficient confidence to manage a 
successful commercialization endeavor, a conservative scholar 
may not choose to become involved in it. 
Moreover, academic engagement can aid in realizing the 
commercial value of knowledge with lower risk. Therefore, risk-
averse scholars may tend to treat academic engagement as 
substitute other than supplement to commercialization.  
In summary, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H2a: Risk-seeking scholars are more likely to participate 
in commercialization.  
H2b: Risk preference negatively moderates the 
relationship between academic engagement and 
commercialization. 
2.3 Organization and commercialization 
Universities have made considerable efforts to stimulate 
commercialization. Some universities have policies on 
rewarding faculty members who are involved in technological 
transfer that results in more licenses (Perkmann, King, & Pavelin, 
2011), and some have established TTOs (Bercovitz et al., 2001) 
to promote commercialization. The patent and copyright policies 
of organizations influence the ability of scientists to 
commercialize (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2006; Debackere & 
Veugelers, 2005), and empirical results have shown that an 
organization’s mission to spread knowledge and the existence of 
a regulatory environment contribute to technology transfer 
(Olaya Escobar et al., 2017).  
Scholars who work in an organization, where 
commercialization is encouraged, may participate more in 
commercialization activities. Moreover, risks of 
commercialization in such organizations are lower. So scholars 
in such organizations may tend to treat academic engagement as 
supplement other than substitute to commercialization. 
Hence, we hypothesize the following:  
H3a: Scholars in organizations that pay greater 
attention to commercialization activities are more likely to 
participate in commercialization. 
H3b: Organization attention positively moderate the 
relationship between academic engagement and 
commercialization. 
Other individual characteristics, such as age, gender and 
previous scientific work, influence commercialization. Among 
all these factors, scholars’ scientific work and the accumulation 
of such work are most influential (Louis, Blumenthal, Gluck, & 
Stoto, 1989; Abreu & Grinevich, 2013; Lam, 2011; Olaya 
Escobar, Berbegal-Mirabent, Alegre, & Duarte Velasco, 2017). 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Our data came from Shanghai Maritime University (SMU). 
Non-anonymous questionnaires were distributed to faculty 
members by the SMU TTO. The survey was conducted in July 
2017, and 106 valid responses were received out of 250 
questionnaires. Information on publications, patents and 
research funding were collected from the TTO. SMU is a public 
university in Shanghai with six major disciplines: engineering, 
management, economics, literature, science and law. There were 
two main considerations regarding the use of this sample. On the 
one hand, SMU is a medium-scale university in China. 
Compared to top universities such as Peking University or 
Tsinghua University, SMU might be more representative of 
universities in the country. On the other hand, SMU has the 
ability and resources to commercialize. Research in the maritime 
industry is very strong, so many of the research outcomes at 
SMU have the potential for further commercialization; since 
SMU has invested considerable effort in technology transfer, we 
chose to investigate the individual and organizational impacts of 
this practice. For example, we examined the first academic 
entrepreneurship case in SMU after the reform took place. 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The key variable in this study is commercialization. We use 
a dummy variable based on the question: “Have you engaged in 
any of the following activities: patent licensing, patent transfer 
through a contract, opening a start-up either through self-
investment or using patent as shares?” The variable is coded as 
1 if the respondent reported at least one type of 
commercialization activity. We define two variables to 
distinguish traditional technological transfer from academic 
entrepreneurship. One is traditional technological transfer 
(Tech_Trans)  , which captures patent licensing and transfer 
activities, and the other is academic entrepreneurship 
 
In 2016, Professor An Bowen from Shanghai Maritime University used his own 
patents and inventions from contract research with enterprises to establish a startup, 
which was the first time in China that a professor successfully established a start-up 
using patents as shares.
 Tech_Trans: If the professor had not engaged in technology transfer, the variable 
was coded as 0. If the professor had participated only in patent licensing or patent 
transfer through a contract, the variable was coded as 1. If the professor had taken 
part in both kinds of transfer activities, the variable was set equal to 2. 
(Ac_Entre).  
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Academic Engagement. We use total funding amount of 
contract research to measure the extent of academic engagement. 
Enterprises or government enter into contracts to solve a 
practical problem or provide consulting services. We collect the 
respondent’s total amount of contract funding in the past three 
years.  
Risk preference.The respondents’ risk preference is 
assessed by the extent to which they agreed with several 
statements, such as “I embrace risk” and “I absolutely hate risks”. 
We use a dummy variable to measure risk preference since 
different respondents may have different understanding of the 
statements. If a respondent’s mean score for the questions is 
higher than the mean for the population, risk preference is 
coded as 1.  
Organization 
Org_attention. We used questions such as “Is your 
department/school focus on technological transfer, and has it 
even set a target?” to measure the attention of an organization. If 
 
 Ac_Entre: If the professor had not engaged in academic entrepreneurship, the 
variable was coded as 0. If the professor had taken part in establishing a start-up 
either by self-investment or by using patents as shares, the variable was coded as 1. 
If the professor had used both methods, the variable was coded as 2. 
the answer is “yes”, we code the variable as 1, 0 otherwise. 
3.2.3 Control Variables  
Individual characteristics such as age, gender, professional 
title, previous amount of international publications, patents, 
consulting work and collaboration and successful case around 
are controlled.  
3.3 Econometric specification 
The hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
academic engagement and commercialization are tested by 
specifying the following econometric model: 
Commercialization= + AE+ RP+ ORG+  
ORG*AE + RP*AE + Controls+ , i=1……106 
A logistic model is estimated when the dependent variable 
is commercialization. When examining the subset of 
commercialization activities, our dependent variables are 
ordered (0,1,2); therefore, we use ordered logistic models. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the descriptive analysis. 
According to Table 1, 15 percent of the respondents had engaged 
in commercialization activities. Regarding the independent 
variables in the table, the average funding of contract research 
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4
β5 β6 εi
(2014-2017) is 412,72 yuan per professor. The mean value for 
risk preference was 0.642. The mean value for successful cases 
and organization attention are 0.642 and 0.509, respectively, 
which indicates that 68 professors are affected by their peers and 
that 54 professors claim their departments pay attention to 
technological transfer.  
Our sample include 85 males and 21 females, and the age 
range is from 28 to 58 years, with an average age of 37 years. 
Title is categorized as middle title, vice-senior title, and senior 
title. The respondents publish an average of 2.9 international 
papers and have 1.132 patents in the last three years.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the variables. The 
correlations between the variables provide support for our 
hypotheses and justify further examination. Significant 
correlations are observed between title and age, which is 
consistent with the reality that one’s title increases with age. 
Specifically, the number of contract research funding 
(Academic_Engagement) is significantly correlated with 
technology transfer/commercialization activities and linked with 
investing methods for commercialization. The method of using 
patents to transfer knowledge (Tech_tran) is correlated with the 
method of investing, which reflects that patents are necessary for 
investment. These results highlight some relationships between 
commercialization and academic engagement.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
4.2 Commercialization and academic engagement 
The results of the econometric models are demonstrated in 
Table 3. Models 1, 2 and 3 present the relationship between 
academic engagement and commercialization. Models 4, 5 and 
6 take the interaction effects into consideration to examine the 
moderate effect of risk preference and organization attention of 
academic engagement on commercialization. 
Models 1, 2 and 3 show that academic engagement has a 
significant influence on commercialization in China. In the 
institutional transition context, scholars with more contract 
research funding are more likely to take part in commercial 
activities, especially those involving academic entrepreneurship. 
Thus, our hypothesis 1 is supported. Moreover, those with higher 
risk preference are more likely to engage in commercialization, 
thereby supporting our hypothesis 2—commercialization 
activities are accompanied by risks, so professors will seriously 
consider the impacts of commercialization before making a 
decision about commercialization. Moreover, institutional 
factors such as the organizational environment have impacts on 
commercialization; organizations with successful cases 
stimulate the transfer of patents. 
Models 4, 5 and 6 reveal an interactive effect of individual 
risk preference, organization attention and academic 
engagement on commercialization. In Model 4, individual risk 
preference and funding for contract research are both positively 
related to commercialization. The interactive term of contract 
research funding and risk preference is negatively related to 
commercialization, indicating that professors who are risk-
seeking will be less likely to take academic engagement into 
consideration to achieve commercialization. The interactive 
term of academic engagement and organization attention is 
positive related to commercialization, demonstrating that 
organizations who encourage commercialization are likely to 
stimulate personal academic engagement to realize 
commercialization. The variable for academic entrepreneurship 
is not significant in our analysis, as academic entrepreneurship 
represents a completely new method for achieving 
commercialization that has seldom been attempted and therefore 
needs further attention. Regarding the control variables, we find 
a positive correlation between sex and patents and reveal that 
male scientists are more likely to engage in patent licensing and 
transfer than female scientists. A successful case of 
commercialization in the surrounding environment stimulates 
patent transfer. Thus, our hypothesis 3 is partly supported. 
In sum, a clear relationship can be seen between academic 
engagement and commercialization. The impacts vary according 
to different academic engagement methods and 
commercialization routes, such as patenting and licensing and 
academic engagement. Moreover, in the context of institutional 
transition in China, professors care about the risks of 
commercialization. Additionally, institutional transition is still 
occurring in relation to commercialization in China, and relevant 
policies are therefore not mature enough to avoid risks. Thus, 
professors who have a low risk preference will take part in 
academic engagement instead of commercialization to spread 
their knowledge to industry. On the other hand, professors with 
high risk preference have less contract research funding because 
they are “brave” enough to license or transfer their patents 
directly; thus, they sign fewer contracts with enterprises. What 
is more, organization attention positively moderates the 
relationship between academic engagement and 
commercialization. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Additional analyses were implemented for the robustness 
checks. We used other control variables for these analyses, for 
example, time spent on scientific research substituted for the 
research accumulation variable, and personal university and 
enterprise research center experience was used to replace past 
academic engagement. This model revealed similar results to 
those observed previously. Funding for contract research 
projects and university-enterprise experience have positive 
impacts on commercialization. Risk preference is related to 
commercialization; high risk preference leads to 
commercialization. Individuals who prefer risk may not have 
more contract research funding. Academic engagement does not 
represent the necessary route to commercialization, and 
department attention stimulates investment. These analyses 
provide robust results that support our conclusions. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
5. Conclusion 
Academic engagement stimulates commercialization. To 
empirically examine the relationship between engagement and 
commercialization in the context of the institutional transition, 
questionnaire data and other relevant data were collected from 
SMU. Individual risk preference, organizational impact and the 
interactive effect of academic engagement and risk preference 
were taken into consideration. We found that professors who are 
conservative but willing to commercialize their academic 
knowledge may attempt to participate in academic engagement 
to avoid some of the risks of commercialization. In addition, 
organizational encouragement stimulates commercialization. 
Based on our results, scholars with more contract funding 
for research are more likely to commercialize, especially via 
academic entrepreneurship. The reason for this finding is 
probably that those with more funding have a higher likelihood 
of maintaining contact with enterprises and meeting the direct 
needs of enterprises; thus, they can engage in commercialization 
more easily. Moreover, with regard to risk preference, those who 
embrace risk have a higher disposition for commercialization. 
Since there are many risks involved in commercialization due to 
the uncertainty of relevant policies and immature practices in 
China, those who are brave or prefer risk will engage in 
commercialization. However, regarding the interactive effect of 
contract funding for research and risk preference, the results 
indicate that professors with high risk preference may participate 
less in academic engagement, while those who are conservative 
will participate more. Because of the uncertainty in their 
institutions, professors will not commercialize their knowledge 
directly but participate in academic engagement to maintain 
contact with enterprises. This phenomenon is unique in the 
institutional transition environment. Finally, we find that 
organizational environment can stimulate commercialization. 
Since SMU is the first to help professors engage in academic 
entrepreneurship in public, the organization has paid greater 
attention than other institutions to the impacts of improving 
commercialization. 
Taken together, these results offer a new perspective of and 
enrich the theory on academic engagement and 
commercialization. Academic engagement is not independent; it 
can stimulate commercialization by providing more 
opportunities and stronger links with industry. Risk preference 
should be considered a supplement to the theory, as different risk 
preferences result in different paths to commercialization. The 
institutional environment is important in the relationship 
between academic engagement and commercialization, and 
departmental attention impacts commercialization.  
The results of our study have some practical implications, 
for example, universities can encourage academic engagement 
in commercialization, such as contract research and consulting. 
Hence, conservative scholars can allow their knowledge to be 
used commercially. Moreover, universities need to make use of 
TTOs to ameliorate the risks of professors, encourage 
commercialization and enable those who truly want to transfer 
their knowledge to do so without fear. Organizations can also 
prioritize specific targets and utilize the effects of peers to 
stimulate commercialization. Last, we cannot avoid problems in 
the institutional transition period of commercialization. Hence, 
the government needs to more seriously consider the practice of 
institutional design and consider adjusting its policies.  
 Table 1. Descriptive Statisticsҁ2015-2017҂ 
 Observations Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
Commercialization 106 0.151 0.360 0 1 
Tech_Trans 106 0.208 0.529 0 2 
Ac_Entre 106 0.179 0.513 0 2 
Independent Variables      
Academic Engagement 106 41.272 114.124 0 619.5 
Risk_preference 106 0.642 0.482 0 1 
Successful_case 106 0.642 0.482 0 1 
Org_attention 106 0.509 0.502 0 1 
Controlled Variables      
Male 106 0.802 0.400 0 1 
Age 106 37.075 6.295 28 58 
Title 101 0.495 0.716 0 2 
Number of international papers 106 2.953 3.440 0 20 
Number of patents 106 1.132 2.575 0 20 
Past consulting service 105 0.562 0.499 0 1 
Past collaboration 105 0.543 0.501 0 1 
 Table 2. Correlation Table 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                                         
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 
[1]Commerciali
zation 
1             
[2Tech_trans 0.48*** 1            
[3]Ac_Entre 0.37*** 0.70*** 1           
[4] Academic 
Engagement 
0.39*** 0.06 0.26** 1          
[5] 
Risk_preference 
0.15 -0.08 -0.05 0.13 1         
[6] 
Successful_case 
0.26** -0.08 0.27 0.15 -0.11 1        
[7]Org_attention 0.10 0.24** 0.27** 0.02 -0.14 0.33*** 1       
[8]Male 0.14 0.15 0.17** 0.17** -0.03 -0.12 -0.11 1      
[9]Age 0.23** -0.08 -0.007 0.12 0.13 0.20 -0.13 0.09 1     
[10]Title 0.15 -0.11 -0.01 0.18 0.07 0.20** -0.10 0.05 0.68*** 1    
[11] Number of 
international 
papers 
0.08 -0.09 -0.08 0.05 0.01 0.001 -0.07 0.12 -0.10 0.26** 1   
[12] Number of 
patents 
0.24** 0.008 0.004 0.15 -0.11 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.27** 0.61*** 1  
[13] Past 
consulting 
service 
0.27** 0.06 0.05 0.28*** 0.09 0.23** 0.01 0.18* 0.39*** 0.37** -0.0004 0.27** 1 
[14] Past 
collaboration  
0.28** 0.04 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.28 0.09 0.26** 0.21** 0.31** 0.14 0.29** 0.62*** 
 
Table 3 Academic engagement, individual preference, 
organizational impact and commercialization (2015-2017) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Commerciali
zation 
Tech_Tra
ns 
Ac_Entre Commercia
lization 
Tech_Trans Ac_Entre 
Academc_Engag
ement 
0.00474* -0.000600 0.00399** 0.0810*** 3.87e-05 0.0128* 
(0.00244) (0.00211) (0.00199) (0.0288) (0.0243) (0.00716) 
Risk_preference 1.448* 0.245 -0.0659 9.250*** 1.530* 0.388 
 (0.836) (0.696) (0.750) (2.956) (0.865) (0.881) 
Org_attention 0.953 0.883 1.602** 0.339 0.285 1.962* 
 (0.721) (0.548) (0.626) (0.931) (0.696) (1.145) 
Successful_case 1.768 2.330** 17.25*** 1.577 2.844** 16.97*** 
 (1.081) (1.066) (0.646) (1.077) (1.239) (0.447) 
Male 1.334 1.928 17.82*** 1.160 2.000 17.47*** 
 (1.164) (1.234) (0.812) (1.337) (1.451) (0.124) 
Age 0.147* -0.0320 0.00685 0.129 -0.0800 0.0219 
 (0.0755) (0.0755) (0.110) (0.0795) (0.0839) (0.113) 
Title -1.028 -0.715 0.0427 -1.047 -1.130* -0.256 
 (0.656) (0.599) (0.715) (0.752) (0.650) (0.823) 
Number_of_inter
national_papers 
-0.0291 -0.107 -0.0272 -0.00772 -0.0972 -0.0272 
(0.130) (0.126) (0.164) (0.159) (0.130) (0.163) 
Number_of_pate
nts 
0.248 0.111 -0.00435 0.574** 0.144 0.00703 
 (0.155) (0.128) (0.204) (0.227) (0.135) (0.211) 
Past_consulting_
service 
-0.114 1.095 -0.160 0.430 1.667 -0.107 
 (1.034) (1.134) (2.028) (0.822) (1.140) (2.036) 
Past_collaboratio
n 
1.204 -0.490 -0.0893 0.462 -1.030 -0.189 
 (1.094) (1.024) (1.596) (1.014) (0.956) (1.495) 
Commercializatio
nXRisk 
   -0.0818*** -0.0348*** -0.00718 
   (0.0290) (0.0120) (0.00609) 
Commercializatio
nXOrg 
   0.00624* 0.0329 -0.00279 
   (0.00368) (0.0239) (0.00366) 
Constant cut1  4.702* 37.79***  4.039* 38.19*** 
  (2.761) (3.705)  (2.453) (3.789) 
Constant cut2  6.104** 38.99***  5.768** 39.39*** 
  (2.914) (3.936)  (2.526) (3.893) 
Constant -12.35***   -18.93***   
 (3.918)   (5.322)   
       
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
  
 
 
Table 4. Robustness analysis: Academic engagement, 
individual preference, organizational impact and 
commercialization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Commerc
ialization 
Tech_Tra
ns 
Ac_Entre Commerc
ialization 
Tech_Trans Ac_Entre 
       
Academic_Enga
gement 
0.00509*
* 
0.000938 0.00473* 0.0403** 0.0216* 0.0108 
(0.00243) (0.00176) (0.00244) (0.0191) (0.0128) (0.00992) 
Risk_preference 1.925** 0.491 0.311 4.746*** 2.020* 0.727 
 (0.832) (0.977) (0.814) (1.820) (1.090) (1.197) 
Org_attention 0.905 1.069 2.118* -0.225 0.660 2.323 
 (0.742) (0.663) (1.089) (0.795) (0.768) (1.555) 
Successful_case 2.374* 2.268** 17.51*** 2.977 2.726*** 16.36*** 
 (1.299) (1.045) (0.440) (1.926) (1.030) (0.658) 
Uni_enterprise_c
ollaboration 
2.791*** 0.980 1.312 3.002*** 0.472 1.066 
(0.935) (0.911) (1.002) (1.067) (0.836) (1.065) 
Uncertainty_pref
erence 
0.757 0.195 0.535 0.0108 -0.584 0.366 
(1.309) (1.035) (1.107) (1.513) (0.986) (1.139) 
Social_preferenc
e 
-1.324 -1.078 -1.523 -1.258 -1.217 -1.625 
(1.153) (0.916) (1.219) (1.642) (0.948) (1.281) 
Male 1.943* 2.122* 18.53*** 1.735* 2.473** 17.50*** 
 (1.156) (1.137) (0.767) (1.039) (1.107) (1.111) 
Age 0.112 -0.00359 0.0198 0.101 -0.0194 0.0275 
 (0.0715) (0.0666) (0.0810) (0.0760) (0.0643) (0.0795) 
Title -0.326 -0.600 -0.162 -0.249 -0.870 -0.311 
 (0.600) (0.584) (0.566) (0.576) (0.669) (0.696) 
Scientific_work_
week 
-0.328 -0.280 -0.421 -0.261 -0.378 -0.453 
(0.491) (0.371) (0.536) (0.521) (0.326) (0.550) 
Academic_Enga
gementXRisk 
   -0.0401** -0.0317*** -0.00496 
   (0.0195) (0.01000) (0.00808) 
Academic_Enga
gementXOrg 
   0.00740*
* 
0.0105 -0.00168 
   (0.00325) (0.0106) (0.00334) 
Constant cut1  4.671 38.22***  4.648* 36.39*** 
  (3.018) (3.581)  (2.822) (3.561) 
Constant cut2  6.075* 39.55***  6.307** 37.72*** 
  (3.131) (3.512)  (2.902) (3.613) 
Constant -10.67**   -12.48**   
 (5.025)   (6.034)   
       
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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